Not only have trade and investment relations reached a substantial scale, but also bilateral lending by Chinese state entities has become an important financing source for some countries in the region. The Inter-American Dialogue,[2] a think tank, estimates that between 2005 and 2013 Chinese state-controlled entities lent an accumulated USD 98 bn to selected Latin American countries. The bulk is loans from China’s policy banks China Development Bank (partially in cooperation with other banks) and China Ex-Im Bank. The numbers are substantial compared to combined multilateral lending by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) of nearly USD 163 bn over the same period.

Three of the countries that President Jinping visited are among the largest recipients of these loans. Venezuela is by far the largest borrower of Chinese funds with a total of more than USD 50 bn in 2005-2013. This equals 51% of total Chinese lending to Latin America (chart). During the official Chinese visit, a new credit line of USD 4 bn was announced. Argentina reportedly signed new loans worth over USD 4.7 bn to build two hydro-electric dams and USD 2.1 bn for a railway project. The country already contracted loans of USD 14 bn in the last nine years, mainly funding infrastructure projects in the railway system. Brazil secured two new loans worth USD 7.4 for a large mining company to buy or lease Chinese ship equipment. In absolute terms, Brazil is the third largest borrower of Chinese loans in Latin America, but compared with its large GDP Chinese lending is still relatively small. That is different in Ecuador, where Chinese loans equal more than 10% of 2013 GDP. The majority of these loans (for a total of USD 10 bn) were directed to the state oil company and hydro-electric projects, and some of the funds were used to finance the state budget deficit.

Eoin Treacy's view

China has well-established global superpower ambitions but apart from its dominance of the rare earth metals and gold mining sectors, it is a significant importer of basic resources. Therefore establishing favourable relationships across Africa and Latin America represent significant policy goals. The fact that China’s investments are generally tied to economic and geopolitical goals rather than governance represents a powerfully attractive consideration for countries that may have difficulty sourcing funding elsewhere. 

Here is a link to the report. 

One of the issues China faces with investing in projects in Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina is that they all rest on the Atlantic side of the continent which represents a lengthy voyage for the extraordinarily large ships now entering service. Even with the expansion of the Panama canal, due to be completed in early 2016, the world’s largest ships will not be able to take the shortcut. This article which originated with the Miami Herald caught my attention. Seeing is believing when it comes to a Nicaragua canal project but there are clear reasons China would be interested in commissioning and controlling such a project.

Jin Wang’s Beijing Xinwei Telecom is privately held and is also promoting the idea of building a $10billion deepwater port in Crimea.