Commodity prices, three possible developments during the Middle East uprisings and their impact on markets
David Fuller's view Every subscriber who has been
with us for more than a few days will presumably recall that for much of last
year Fullermoney repeatedly described commodities
as an opportunity which would also become the next problem for the global economy.
That
problem arrived first in the form of soaring prices for most agricultural commodities,
as you can see from this weekly chart of the Dow
Jones UBS Softs Index. This surge commenced in June 2010 when Russia's drought
and heat wave caused the first in a worldwide series of poor crop returns, at
a time when global demand was also increasing. We have all heard about food
price inflation in recent months but industrial soft commodities such as cotton
and rubber also accelerated higher.
These trends were fuelled by supply shortages and increasing speculation.
This
week, events in the Middle East have caused the price of crude oil, particularly
the Brent contract, to surge.
Fullermoney
also described an eventual spike in the price of crude oil (NYME
& Brent) as the greatest threat to
the global economy. While the price of crude oil had been ranging gradually
higher for some time, the spike came sooner than we would have normally expected
or hoped - "Events, dear boy, events", as Harold Macmillan famously
said. A not insignificant factor behind recent events in the Middle East has
been food price inflation.
The oil
spike is a moderate economic threat, so far, priced in a soft USD and at a time
when global usage is more efficient than ever before. However we have yet to
see any evidence that the price increase is over. It has been more extreme in
Europe where most Libyan oil is delivered. As in 2008, the move above $100 a
barrel by NYME crude is caused mainly by speculation, but the current concern
over supplies from the Middle East is understandable. An uncertain political
outcome in that region and the sharp rise in crude prices over the last few
days are a recipe for extreme forecasts, based more on people's fears rather
than insightful analysis.
Here
are some possible scenarios:
1.
Best case - Qaddafi and his sons soon flee Libya or are removed from power by
other means, and a tribal power sharing arrangement reduces the risk of further
civil war. There are other potential dominos among oil exporters, not least
Algeria, but a resumption of normal oil flows from Libya would calm markets.
Crucially, the risk of serious unrest in Saudi Arabia remains small. The less
privileged Shiite minority is between only 10 to 15 percent of the total population,
according to Wikipedia.
King Abdullah is popular among regional leaders and has just announced a massive
"$36 billion worth of new jobless benefits, education and housing subsidies,
and debt write-offs", mentionen in today's report from Bloomberg.
Saudi Arabia has also pledged to replace any lost Libyan output. Under this
best case scenario oil prices peak close to current levels and fall back sharply.
2. Worst
case - Libya and Algeria remain embroiled in lengthy civil wars, all but stopping
their oil exports for a sustained period. Regional unrest increases and Iran
becomes considerably more active in developing militant alliances with Shiite
populations. The price of crude oil spikes sharply higher from current levels.
Elderly King Abdullah becomes a waning influence in Saudi Arabia, creating greater
uncertainty. Global stock markets slump on justifiable concern over rapidly
deteriorating economic prospects and a worsening outlook for corporate profits.
3. In-between
case - The key factor here is that the oil price, while not spiking to extreme
levels, would remain higher for longer than the global economy could successfully
handle. Consequently global GDP growth would slow, with a number of western
countries suffering stagflation or recession.
Subscribers
may have their own variations on these three scenarios and are probably as qualified
as anyone to make educated guesses about the outcome. The key is to think analytically,
rather than emotionally. Everyone thinks they are responding analytically to
a crisis but few actually do. We need look no further back than 2008-2009 for
ample evidence of this.
I do
not know which of the three approximate scenarios will prevail, but I suspect
the odds are in favour of either 1 or a combination of 1&2 above. With an
uncertain outcome and daily developments to monitor, markets are likely to remain
volatile and sensitive to sudden changes in the news - good or bad. Right now,
the key barometers of sentiment are crude
oil, gold and the S&P
500 Index.
This
item continues tomorrow, with a closer look at asset classes.