David Fuller's view Global sentiment towards China's economy and asset markets has turned from exuberance just a few months ago to overriding concern about the side-effects of last year's remarkable credit growth.

A number of commentators have warned of credit excesses and an overinvestment bubble, which they say could bring economic turmoil. Critics have also pointed to China's Rmb4,000bn ($585bn) stimulus programme and last year's 33 per cent surge in new bank lending as obvious hallmarks of excess liquidity and a lowering of lending standards. Some have raised concerns about hidden debt risks among local government investment entities, while media reports of Chinese "ghost cities" and empty commercial property are cited as evidence of local excesses.

The worst-case fears concerning the property market are based on a layer of truth and we have previously highlighted the untenable nature of price increases in some big cities, as well as the possibility that last year's boom was partly fuelled by misdirected bank loans. However, there are crucial differences between China's property markets and those of the US or Dubai.

Unlike the dramatic increase in household leverage that precipitated the US subprime crisis, Chinese household debt amounts to approximately 17 per cent of gross domestic product, compared with roughly 96 per cent in the US and 62 per cent in the eurozone. Home buyers in China are required to make minimum downpayments of 30 per cent before receiving a mortgage, and at least 40 per cent for a second home.

Although price increases in the Chinese residential market appear rapid (more than 20 per cent in 2009), such headline figures cannot be viewed in isolation. Over the past five years, urban household incomes grew at a 13.2 per cent compound annual growth rate, compared with an 11.9 per cent CAGR in home prices. Pockets of overheating can be found in some regional markets. In Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hangzhou, for instance, prices outpaced income growth by more than 5 percentage points over the same period. But, this can be seen as a symptom of new urban wealth being put to speculative use, rather than the profligate use of leverage.