Putin the institution, however, is a tangible presence. Bank Rossiya shareholders, big government contract winners such as Putin's former judo sparring partner Arkady Rotenberg, lesser-known St. Petersburg businessmen who knew Putin when he was a city official in the 1990's or a KGB officer in earlier decades -- all of these people made their fortunes under the Putin regime. There's nothing surprising about their access to cheap state bank funds, or about the "consulting" and "lobbying" contracts they received from less connected businesses. In a dictatorial regime, the dictator's cronies make money; their network is the fabric of power.

Is this an arrangement that should anger Russian citizens? Of course it is. That Putin's cronies are a predatory, parasitical, privileged class of businessmen was known long before the Panama dump. The Kremlin refused to respond to the investigative groups' questions on the grounds that these questions have been asked "more than once in different variations," and that's true. What has always been missing is the final link to Putin the man.  And, given the nature of the data used in the ICIJ investigation, perhaps it's time to admit that no such link exists. Putin doesn't own yachts or palaces; he has no $200 billion fortune, as sometimes speculated. He is not "secretly the world's richest man." However, as the former KGB case officer that he is, Putin does surround himself with a network of people who have indeed become rich.

Because he is the president, these people count on their association with Putin to help them make money. Because they count on their association with him, he -- as someone who can take away both the opportunities and the assets -- has the ability to call on the proceeds should he need them. The OCCRP investigation into Bayevskiy's real estate deals shows how that may work.

This approach is different from, but reminiscent of the scheme once run by Boris Berezovsky, the billionaire who claimed to have helped make Putin president in 2000. Berezovsky, who apparently killed himself in the U.K. in 2013, pioneered a business scheme under which an asset remains under government control, but its managers are "privatized" -- corrupted, in more conventional terms. They then milk the state company in the interests of their "buyer."

Putin is not stealing Russia's vast wealth; he's handing some of it over to trusted individuals to manage. In the process, they are very likely to profit from that wealth. He maintains good relationships with these people. He also controls the business environment so tightly that they can't risk betraying him. He can also have his network do whatever he might require extra-budgetary funds to do (the $50 billion Sochi Winter Olympics springs to mind).

If Putin is ever overthrown, he will be as difficult to convict on charges of corruption as former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and his associates have been. After all, they had only imitated what Putin was doing in Russia. Putin, however, has no obvious contingency plan in case he's overthrown. The financial arrangements described by the ICIJ on the basis of the Panama files would leave him with nothing if he ceased to be Putin the institution, as well as the man. 

This system, which rests on Putin's ability to control a network of friends and associates, does not allow for any upheavals. He is gambling his future wellbeing on his ability to maintain a firm grip on power. If that seems foolhardy for one of the world's shrewdest politicians, it may not be. Yanukovych fled to Russia after Ukrainians ousted him in 2014. Putin would have nowhere to go if removed, even if he had amassed wealth in his own name. Too many in the West would gleefully hunt him down. He has no option but to remain at the center of the web he has created, its hostage as much as its controller.

David Fuller's view

The interesting questions concern how and when Vladimir Putin’s regime will end?  It will certainly not be in the manner of Mikhail Gorbachev, who apparently had little blood on his hands and became a distinguished international figure after he stepped down from power.  Nor will it be in the manner of Putin’s predecessor Boris Yeltsin, an affable character who mainly wanted to have fun after he selected Putin following a guarantee that he would remain free of any charges.  In comparison, Putin looks secure but he has plenty of enemies, not least within Russia.