It’s Germany’s worst nightmare. Increasingly isolated, ganged up on, and even hated by much of southern Europe, it is fast losing the argument over the future of the euro.

Even the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, has been at it. This week he joined in the German bashing with a full-frontal attack on Berlin’s austerity agenda. And it’s causing confusion, dismay and resentment in equal measure in this most stable, disciplined and civilised of nations.

To understand the decisive shift in narrative that has taken place in Europe over the last couple of weeks – from the defeat Germany has suffered at the hands of the European Central Bank, to the Syriza victory in Greece and its demands for debt forgiveness – you have to go back to the euro’s origins and Germany’s place in it.

Germans never wanted the single currency in the first place, for like Britain, they instinctively understood where it would lead – to a fiscal, or transfer, union which Germany, as Europe’s dominant economy, would be forced to bankroll. If given a referendum, they’d have said no.

But European monetary union was the price Germany had to pay for reunification; it was a way, other European nations naively believed, of containing the newly enlarged country and ensuring that it was properly integrated into the rest of Europe. To them, it seemed the answer to Europe's historic problem - Germany was too large and economically powerful ever to be properly defeated, but the potential threat it poses to the rest of Europe could perhaps be defused through economic integration. Most Germans, now a peace loving people, broadly go along with this "solution" to the problem. The point of dispute is rather about the degree of integration.

To buttress itself against economic pollution from the south, Germany surrounded the new currency and its institutions with safeguards. Fiscal and monetary transfers between nations were specifically banned, and rules were put in place that would supposedly ensure fiscal discipline. None of them has proved equal to the task, and none of them is ultimately compatible with a single currency that actually works.

Since the onset of the financial crisis, Germany has suffered one defeat after another. Every line in the sand has been breached, culminating last week in the Bundesbank’s failure to block ECB money printing, a remedy which may or may not have some merit for the beleaguered economies of the south but is culturally anathema to Germans as well as largely inappropriate for their economy. It's also a money transfer by the backdoor.

The bottom line is that the single currency hasn’t worked for anyone. It’s proved as unsatisfactory for Germany as it has for Greece, Spain and Italy. Happy families are all alike, begins Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. The observation could have been written for Europe’s experiment in monetary union.

David Fuller's view

Here is a PDF version of the article.

The establishment of Europe’s single currency was a political rather than economic decision from Brussels.  It was also undemocratic, because the EU’s leaders, many of them unelected, had no intention of allowing citizens to vote on such an important decision.  They knew that citizens in Germany and may other EU countries would have voted against the single currency. 

That decision, made on behalf of independent nations without the approval of their citizens, was a bad omen in terms of the EU’s potential.  Only Swiss political leaders had the foresight within Europe to agree unanimously on staying outside the EU, at least until it had proved to be a success, as one pragmatic subscriber from Switzerland explained to me at the time. 

I commend the rest of this article to readers.