More broadly, the three “moments” of reckoning we discussed above mean that global supply chains, whether they produce military or civilian goods, are facing a Minsky Moment – a Real Minsky Moment. Paul McCulley’s term referred to the implosion of the long -intermediation chains of the shadow banking system that marked the onset of the Great Financial Crisis. Today, we are witnessing the implosion of the long -intermediation chains of the globalized world order: masks, baby formula, chips, missiles, and artillery shells, for now. The triggers aren’t a lack of liquidity and capital in the banking and shadow banking systems, but a lack of inventory and protection in the globalized production system, in which we design at home and manage from home, but source, produce, and ship everything from abroad, where commodities, factories, and fleets of ships are dominated by states – Russia and China – that are in conflict with the West.

Inventory for supply chains is what liquidity is for banks. In 2007 -08, big banks ran on “just -in -time” liquidity: the dominant form of liquidity was market liquidity, for which you could always sell assets into a deep market without moving prices, so you did not have to have liquidity reserves at the central bank. Similarly, big corporations today run “just -in -time” supply chains for which they assume that they can always source what they need without moving the price. But not really: the U.S. military has to wait a little bit as Raytheon “will take a little while”; Taiwan and Saudi Arabia have to wait as well until the conflict in Ukraine is over; and if your washing machine broke recently, you’ll have to wait a bit too until defense contractors are done buying them up to rip chips out to make missiles.

In propagating the Belt and Road Initiative, China has long complained that the USA’s policy towards it is one of containment. That has become more much overt since 2016. Sanctions on chip manufacturing capacity are an escalation. The rationale for such moves is obvious. The USA and Europe need time to rebuild domestic manufacturing capacity.

On November 24th I posted a review of candidates I believe likely to prosper in the emerging post-pandemic market. It was well received by subscribers so I will post an update on my views on the first Friday of the month going forward. That way subscribers can have an expectation that long-term themes will be covered in a systematic manner and will have a point of reference to look back on.

Media hysteria about the 2nd or 3rd waves has not led to new highs in the number of deaths. The success of biotech companies in deploying vaccines means there is going to be a substantial recovery in the economic activity in 2021 and going forward.

The stay-at-home champions saw their sales growth surge in 2020. It will be impossible to sustain that growth rate in 2021. That’s particularly true for mega-caps. One-way bets on the sector are likely to work less well in the FAANGs going forward.

As per JPM and Nomura   the mkt is pricing a Biden win, caution that a blue wave is necessary, otherwise will get gridlock.

Even if it happens probably get turmoil specially if we do not get clean sweep. Otherwise legal problems will be forthcoming. The groups would be HC, alternative energies, cyclical, education, infrastructure. Also China as frictions will be reduced

Can you identify possible winners, using the charts and share them?

Trust you and your family are well. Stay safe.

The narrative about who will win the US Presidential election has morphed over the last couple of weeks to pricing in a Biden victory. The catalyst for this change was the debate where the two candidates harangued each other and dropped the bar for political decorum another notch lower. Since then, confidence among Democrats has increased substantially. There has been talk of a double-digit margin of victory and a blue wave where they control both legislative branches and the Presidency.

When we look at the company’s costs and expenses per barrel of oil equivalent (BOE), we find they totaled $14.01 for 2019.  Based on the company’s average oil price (which was not adjusted for its gas output given its low price), this translates into a cash profit margin per BOE of $36.88.  If we include the cost of depreciation, depletion and amortization expense (largely a non-cash expense), but indicative of the amount of investment the company needs to make to insure it replaces produced barrels and remains an ongoing enterprise, the cash profit per BOE falls to $19.06, or 37.4% of the average selling price after adjusting for hedging.  That is a pretty attractive return.  

With WTI oil futures prices falling to $20 per barrel, and assuming the location and quality discount remains at $6, Whiting Petroleum was looking at generating no positive cash from the oil it produced.  It also assumes cash operating expenses remain at 2019 levels.  This means Whiting Petroleum would be unable to invest in new exploration and development, which makes the company a self-liquidating entity.  In that condition, the company essentially has no value.  The bankruptcy filing indicates that reality, as current shareholders will only retain 3% of the shares of the reorganized company, as the debt holders will hold 97% in return for agreeing to cancel their bonds.  

Under today’s very depressed oil and gas prices, few producers will be able to fund operations.  If the companies have a significant amount of debt on their balance sheets, they will face serious challenges to sustain their businesses if they do not address their financial leverage.  To understand the precarious health of the producer sector, Energy consultant Rystad has prepared a chart showing the debt maturity schedule and annual interest expense for a group of 29 significant producers.  While this represents only 29 producers, we believe it is indicative of the financial condition of the balance of the producer sector.  

The only way the unconventional oil sector is going to make it through the current crisis is to reduce the cost of production. There is no getting around the fact hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling operations are considerably more expensive than conventional drilling. Technological innovation will help improve that spread but it will be impossible to eliminate. Therefore, scale and proximity to end markets are the primary route to reducing costs.

Last week in Vienna, ministers from Russia, Saudi Arabia and other members of the group left a fractious meeting with no deal to continue the cuts beyond April 1. Saudi Arabia heavily discounted its oil over the weekend, triggering a plunge of more than 20% in international crude futures.

Rosneft’s London-listed shares dropped 19.5% on Monday, while markets in Moscow were closed for a public holiday. In a separate statement, Russia’s finance ministry said that the country’s oil-wealth reserves would be sufficient to cover lost revenue “for six to 10 years” at oil prices of $25 to $30 a barrel.

 

Unconventional oil and gas has been one of the biggest gamechangers for the global economy in history. When the world’s biggest consumer, where production peaked decades ago morphs into the world’s biggest producer and a net exporter it changes the fundamentals and interrelationships of the market.

After a week characterised by selling across the board, a great deal of profit taking has taken place and many overextensions relative to the trend mean have been unwound. The question I believe many people will be concerned with is whether the coronavirus is going to be the catalyst for an economic contraction? I thought it would therefore be worth monitoring the kinds of instruments that offer a lead indicator for that kind of concern.

Berkshire Hathaway Energy is now celebrating its 20th year under our ownership. That anniversary suggests that we should be catching up with the company’s accomplishments.

We’ll start with the topic of electricity rates. When Berkshire entered the utility business in 2000, purchasing 76% of BHE, the company’s residential customers in Iowa paid an average of 8.8 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). Prices for residential customers have since risen less than 1% a year, and we have promised that there will be no base rate price increases through 2028. In contrast, here’s what is happening at the other large investor-owned Iowa utility: Last year, the rates it charged its residential customers were 61% higher than BHE’s. Recently, that utility received a rate increase that will widen the gap to 70%.

The extraordinary differential between our rates and theirs is largely the result of our huge accomplishments in converting wind into electricity. In 2021, we expect BHE’s operation to generate about 25.2 million megawatt-hours of electricity (MWh) in Iowa from wind turbines that it both owns and operates. That output will totally cover the annual needs of its Iowa customers, which run to about 24.6 million MWh. In other words, our utility will have attained wind self-sufficiency in the state of Iowa.

In still another contrast, that other Iowa utility generates less than 10% of its power from wind. Furthermore, we know of no other investor-owned utility, wherever located, that by 2021 will have achieved a position of wind self-sufficiency. In 2000, BHE was serving an agricultural-based economy; today, three of its five largest customers are high-tech giants. I believe their decisions to site plants in Iowa were in part based upon BHE’s ability to deliver renewable, low-cost Energy.

Of course, wind is intermittent, and our blades in Iowa turn only part of the time. In certain periods, when the air is still, we look to our non-wind generating capacity to secure the electricity we need. At opposite times, we sell the excess power that wind provides us to other utilities, serving them through what’s called “the grid.” The power we sell them supplants their need for a carbon resource – coal, say, or natural gas.

Berkshire Hathaway now owns 91% of BHE in partnership with Walter Scott, Jr. and Greg Abel. BHE has never paid Berkshire Hathaway a dividend since our purchase and has, as the years have passed, retained $28 billion of earnings. That pattern is an outlier in the world of utilities, whose companies customarily pay big dividends – sometimes reaching, or even exceeding, 80% of earnings. Our view: The more we can invest, the more we like it.

Today, BHE has the operating talent and experience to manage truly huge utility projects – requiring investments of $100 billion or more – that could support infrastructure benefitting our country, our communities and our shareholders. We stand ready, willing and able to take on such opportunities.

I found this to be an enlightening discussion of the utilities sector. The long-held perception is that these kinds of businesses can afford to pay out the majority of free cashflow in dividends because they are charging rents on established pieces of infrastructure with easily forecastable maintenance and renewal trajectories. As Berkshire’s experience with wind demonstrates, this ignores the long-term risk of exogenous shocks, technological innovation, changing regulation and infrastructure reaching the end of its useful life.

A final batch of questions focused on how important major oil company dividends were to holding up their share prices? We believe it is an important consideration, but the question of dividends and the major oil companies may actually foreshadow a discussion of their future business models. If a company is stuck in a low-growth industry, which oil certainly is, then spending inordinate sums of money to lift the growth rate may not be worth it. For oil companies, the cost for finding and developing new oil production to boost a company’s output growth rate from 2% to 3% to say 5% to 6%, without the company having any control over the price it receives for the product, should raise questions about their long-term business strategy. Maybe it is better to develop a steady, albeit low, production growth profile while using the surplus cash flow to maintain, and potentially increase, the dividend to shareholders. That might be a way to sustain a company’s stock market valuation and secure stable shareholder support. This strategy implies that capital spending would always be at risk in low commodity price environments, but the strategy could lead to stable employment, which is critical for securing and sustaining the technical talent required in the petroleum business. This strategy, however, wouldn’t work for smaller E&P companies needing capital to grow as their ability to tap the capital markets likely requires that they demonstrate rapid production growth. As we are learning, that strategy can be deadly in a period of low commodity prices. So if major oil companies were to adopt slow-growth production goals while defending and increasing their dividends, their share prices might not decline.

A link to the full report is posted in the Subscriber's Area. 

Capital Expenditure budgets have evaporated as companies deal with the revised economics of oil and gas development. On the plus side they have already taken significant write downs so any production that comes online as a result of previous investment can be considered already funded. Companies like Exxon Mobil, at a rating of AAA, are considered better credits than many sovereigns and the removal of the burden of capital expenditure leaves them in a better position to sustain their businesses into the medium term.