



How safe are US Treasuries?

Rajiv Setia, US Fixed Income Strategy


Amrut Nashikkar, US Fixed Income Strategy

Anshul Pradhan, US Fixed Income Strategy


PLEASE SEE ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES STARTING AFTER SLIDE 25

Greece has focused investor attention on sovereign risk

Greece is a small player in the Eurozone




But resolution has major implications for the peripherals




Source: Barclays Capital, Haver, OECD

CDS market is a useful leading indicator

Risk concerns have been apparent in the sovereign CDS market




Widening in CDS precedes negative ratings news




Source: Barclays Capital

Sovereign risk is spreading to developed economies

Recent widening of sovereign CDS for developed economies




Cash markets tell the same story




Source: Barclays Capital

Why is the UK's AAA rating under threat while the US is seemingly immune?

On many financial metrics, the US and UK look similar – high government debt, low savings rate



Using an “implied” ratings framework provides clues




The US can finance large amounts in the international market because the US dollar is the world's reserve currency

Note: Implied ratings are based on a cluster analysis of selected economic and financial indicators

Source: Barclays Capital, OECD outlook


If the dollar's status is stable, the US can withstand significant fiscal deterioration

Trigger points for US rating downgrade to debt and contingent liabilities, ceteris paribus



World USD reserves: ■ 50% ■ 55% ■ 60% ■ 65%

Trigger points for US rating downgrade to GDP growth and inflation, ceteris paribus



World USD reserves: ■ 50% ■ 55% ■ 60% ■ 65%


Combination scenario that could trigger a US rating downgrade

World USD reserves	Debt/GDP	Contingent liabilities	GDP growth	Inflation
55%	100%	13%	0%	3%


Source: Barclays Capital

Rapid reserve diversification leads to crowding out in the US


Foreign central banks diversifying away from \$




Mostly into euro



Steady diversification reduces foreign ownership of US Treasuries



Putting a burden on domestic investors




Source: IMF, Barclays Capital




Increased Euro sovereign risk is positive for US rates

US rates rally when sovereign CDS widens




	$\Delta(\text{US 10y rate, bp})$	$\Delta(\text{US 10y rate, bp})$	$\Delta(\text{US 10y rate, weekly})$
$\Delta(\text{Other CDS, bp})$	-0.52	-0.57	-0.62
t-stat	-2.76**	-3.46**	-2.91**
$\Delta(\text{US CDS, bp})$	-0.10	-	-
t-stat	-0.5	-	-
Intercept	0.06	-0.10	-0.35
t-stat	0.14	-0.29	-0.29
Observations	629	629	135

Market has not fully priced in flight to quality potential for US



Reserve diversification away from Japan since it lost AAA status



Recap

- Near term, we do not think that the US AAA rating is in danger
- Negative news about PIIGS/other European countries/Japan may lead to reserve diversification *away* from these countries
 - *Does not appear priced in US rates*
- Very different story over the medium to long term if projected fiscal deficits are realized and dollar's reserve status diminishes

Implied and actual ratings for the top 30 countries

Country	GDP (USD Billion,2007)	S&P Rating	Implied rating
United States	13751	AAA	AAA
Japan	4385	AA	AA
China	3206	A+	A+
Germany	3317	AAA	AAA
U.K.	2772	AAA	AA+
France	2589	AAA	AAA
Italy	2101	A+	AA
Spain	1437	AA+	AA+
Canada	1330	AAA	AAA
Brazil	1313	BBB-	BBB+
Russia	1290	BBB	BB
India	1177	BBB-	BBB-
Korea	970	A	A+
Mexico	1022	BBB+	BBB+
Australia	821	AAA	AA+

Country	GDP (USD Billion,2007)	S&P Rating	Implied rating
Turkey	656	BB-	BB-
Sweden	454	AAA	AAA
Indonesia	433	BB-	BB+
Switzerland	424	AAA	AAA
Poland	422	A-	A-
Norway	388	AAA	AAA
Taiwan	355	AA-	A
Austria	373	AAA	AAA
Greece	313	A-	A-
Denmark	312	AAA	AAA
South Africa	283	BBB+	BB+
Argentina	262	B-	B-
Ireland	259	AAA*	AA+
Thailand	245	BBB+	BB+
Finland	245	AAA	AAA


Implied rating is worse than actual

Implied rating is better than actual



US faces significant fiscal challenges

Fiscal metrics on an unsustainable path



Financeability - Ability to raise debt

Affordability? - Interest costs relative to federal revenues

Reversibility?? – Political will to impose credible plan for fiscal discipline

Source: CBO, Barclays Capital. CBO Baseline has been adjusted using its own estimate of the president's policies (as of June 2009) and assuming that appropriations grow @GDP instead of inflation. Interest cost has been forecast assuming that the forward path is realized and the Treasury gradually terms out debt

Medium-term risks to US AAA status


Projecting the path of key fiscal metrics

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
CBO baseline primary deficit, Jan-2010, \$bn	-1,142	-747	-370	-206	-79	-21	-2	47	82	27
a. EGTRRA/JGTRRA tax cut extension	0	-102	-185	-199	-210	-221	-230	-240	-250	-260
b. Other tax Provisions	-12	-67	-151	-151	-160	-165	-173	-183	-188	-194
c. Indexing the AMT to inflation	-7	-69	-31	-35	-39	-44	-50	-58	-66	-77
d. Interaction of a and c	0	-18	-39	-43	-46	-49	-52	-55	-57	-60
e. Appropriations grow @ nominal GDP	0	-9	-37	-82	-129	-170	-207	-244	-279	-315
Total primary deficit	-1,160	-1,012	-813	-715	-664	-669	-715	-733	-758	-879
Interest cost, (along the forward path)	-178	-267	-366	-449	-531	-620	-699	-788	-871	-967
Total deficits	-1,338	-1,279	-1,179	-1,165	-1,195	-1,289	-1,414	-1,520	-1,629	-1,846
Key fiscal metrics										
Total deficit/GDP	-9%	-9%	-7%	-7%	-7%	-7%	-7%	-8%	-8%	-9%
Debt held by public/GDP	62%	68%	72%	74%	77%	80%	85%	89%	93%	98%
Interest cost/revenue	8%	11%	14%	16%	17%	19%	20%	22%	23%	25%


Source: CBO, Barclays Capital. CBO Baseline has been adjusted using its own estimate of the president's policies (as of June 2009) and assuming that appropriations grow @GDP instead of inflation. Interest cost has been forecast assuming that the forward path is realized and the Treasury gradually terms out debt

Revenues/outlays in a historical context

Revenues to improve, but outlays projected to worsen




Improvement in deficits temporary




Source: CBO

Revenues projected to rise to historical average


Revenues should rise



Led by individual and corporate income taxes



Sustainable strong growth a way out ?




Source: CBO




Reduction in spending: Tough choices


Outlays projected to remain a high % of GDP




Rising interest cost outweighs reductions



Reduction in discretionary spending a way out



Limited room to manoeuvre in mandatory spending




Source: CBO


Rising interest rates a major risk

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Key fiscal metrics										
Total deficit/GDP	-9%	-9%	-7%	-7%	-7%	-7%	-7%	-8%	-8%	-9%
Debt held by public/GDP, %	62%	68%	72%	74%	77%	80%	85%	89%	93%	98%
Interest cost/revenue	8%	11%	14%	16%	17%	19%	20%	22%	23%	25%

Interest coverage ratio to breach historical highs by 2015



Even sooner if rates rise




Source: CBO, Barclays Capital. CBO Baseline has been adjusted using its own estimate of the president's policies (as of June 2009) and assuming that appropriations grow @GDP instead of inflation. Interest cost has been forecast assuming that the forward path is realized and the Treasury gradually terms out debt



Neither inflation nor devaluation is an option

Higher inflation worsens the deficit problem



Highly dependent on foreign investors



Source: CBO, Federal Reserve

GSEs: No hints in the president's FY11 budget

Higher cumulative draw from Treasury, but lower dividend payments and no change in draws from 2012 on

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Totals	
														2011-2015	2011-2020
Transactions between Treasury and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac:															
Senior Preferred Liquidity Payments to Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac	96	69	23	23	23
Senior Preferred Dividend Payments from Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac	-4	-12	-18	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-44	-78
Net Payments	91	57	5	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-21	-55

- Released February 1, the president's FY11 budget raises more questions than it answers
- Peak cumulative draw amount is \$188bn, up from the year-ago estimate of \$173bn
 - Assumes no paydowns of this amount in 2012 and beyond – conservatorship lasts indefinitely
 - Dividend payments reduce from \$18bn/yr in 2011 (or about 10%) to \$7bn/yr thereafter
 - Implies a cut in the coupon to below 4%
- We believe further losses are in store for FNM/FRE; our base case is for \$230bn combined


“The Administration continues to monitor the situation of the GSEs closely and will continue to provide updates on considerations for longer term reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as appropriate.”

- From p.352, Credit and Insurance, Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the US Government for FY 2011


Insurmountable losses, but receivership is not an option yet

- Full government ownership would place the GSEs on the government balance sheet
 - if explicitly guaranteed, debt will be subject to the borrowing limit, which could be politically infeasible
 - Projected deficits in 2010-15 will already require a politically risky increase in the borrowing limit

Debt ceiling becomes a limiting factor



Worsening debt/GDP ratio threatens AAA rating status of US







Market implications

A steeper Treasury curve: Sovereign risk and supply demand imbalance

Underweight countries with higher sovereign risk




Reverse diversification favors US curve steepeners



Supply-demand imbalance also favors steepeners

Ex-Ante Demand	Total
Overseas	+600
Banks	+300
Households	+600
Pension allocation	+100
Total ex-ante demand	1,600
Total net term FI supply	2,640
Imbalance	-1,040


Market is priced for a flatter curve



Greener pastures across the pond

- Fundamentally, EIB/KfW should trade through FNM/FRE; US sovereign risk is being underpriced

EIB/KfW versus FNM/FRE



Foreign GGB versus TLGP

bp	GGB ASW		Sovereign CDS	
	3y	5y	3y	5y
US	-10 (FRE)		41	43
	0 (TLGP)			
UK	37		65	82
France	7		42	50
Germany	-3 (KfW)		29	35
Netherlands	25		26	34
Sweden	24		35	49
Australia	21		46	54


Source: Barclays Capital

Front-end swap spreads: Widening in the Libor-OIS basis

Banking ratings are supported by expectations of sovereign support

Entity	S&P	
	Rating (ICR)	Standalone (SACP)
Credit Suisse	A+	A+
JP Morgan	A+	A+
BNP Paribas	AA	AA
Deutsche Bank	A+	A+
Goldman Sachs	A	BBB+
Societe Generale	A+	A+
Morgan Stanley	A	BBB
UBS	A+	A-
Citigroup	A	BBB-
Bank of America	A	BBB
Nomura	BBB+	BBB+
Wells Fargo	AA-	AA-
HSBC	AA-	AA-
Lloyds	A	BBB-
RBS	A	BBB-

Potential widening in Libor-OIS basis in the absence of government support




Source: Barclays Capital, CBO


Long-end swap spreads should drift tighter: Treasury supply and related sovereign risk

- Long end spreads could drift further into negative territory as supply of government paper remains high.
- Sovereign risk also argues for tighter long-end spreads as investors question the creditworthiness of long-dated government paper
- Negative long end spreads would force Libor issuers in the front end of the curve.


Embedded Treasury supply expectations



Treasury supply modestly priced



Long-end spreads and sovereign CDS



Reg AC and Important Disclosures

Analyst Certification(s)

We, Rajiv Setia, Amrut Nashikkar and Anshul Pradhan, hereby certify (1) that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect our personal views about any or all of the subject securities or issuers referred to in this research report and (2) no part of our compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this research report.

Important Disclosures

For current important disclosures regarding companies that are the subject of this research report, please send a written request to: Barclays Capital Research Compliance, 745 Seventh Avenue, 17th Floor, New York, NY 10019 or refer to <https://ecommerce.barcap.com/research/cgi-bin/all/disclosuresSearch.pl> or call 212-526-1072.

Barclays Capital does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that Barclays Capital may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Any reference to Barclays Capital includes its affiliates. Barclays Capital and/or an affiliate thereof (the "firm") regularly trades, generally deals as principal and generally provides liquidity (as market maker or otherwise) in the debt securities that are the subject of this research report (and related derivatives thereof). The firm's proprietary trading accounts may have either a long and / or short position in such securities and / or derivative instruments, which may pose a conflict with the interests of investing customers. Where permitted and subject to appropriate information barrier restrictions, the firm's fixed income research analysts regularly interact with its trading desk personnel to determine current prices of fixed income securities. The firm's fixed income research analyst(s) receive compensation based on various factors including, but not limited to, the quality of their work, the overall performance of the firm (including the profitability of the investment banking department), the profitability and revenues of the Fixed Income Division and the outstanding principal amount and trading value of, the profitability of, and the potential interest of the firms investing clients in research with respect to, the asset class covered by the analyst. To the extent that any historical pricing information was obtained from Barclays Capital trading desks, the firm makes no representation that it is accurate or complete. All levels, prices and spreads are historical and do not represent current market levels, prices or spreads, some or all of which may have changed since the publication of this document. Barclays Capital produces a variety of research products including, but not limited to, fundamental analysis, equity-linked analysis, quantitative analysis, and trade ideas. Recommendations contained in one type of research product may differ from recommendations contained in other types of research products, whether as a result of differing time horizons, methodologies, or otherwise.

Disclaimer

This publication has been prepared by Barclays Capital, the investment banking division of Barclays Bank PLC, and/or one or more of its affiliates as provided below. This publication is provided to you for information purposes only. Prices shown in this publication are indicative and Barclays Capital is not offering to buy or sell or soliciting offers to buy or sell any financial instrument. Other than disclosures relating to Barclays Capital, the information contained in this publication has been obtained from sources that Barclays Capital believes to be reliable, but Barclays Capital does not represent or warrant that it is accurate or complete. The views in this publication are those of Barclays Capital and are subject to change, and Barclays Capital has no obligation to update its opinions or the information in this publication. Barclays Capital and its affiliates and their respective officers, directors, partners and employees, including persons involved in the preparation or issuance of this document, may from time to time act as manager, co-manager or underwriter of a public offering or otherwise, in the capacity of principal or agent, deal in, hold or act as market-makers or advisors, brokers or commercial and/or investment bankers in relation to the securities or related derivatives which are the subject of this publication.

The analyst recommendations in this report reflect solely and exclusively those of the author(s), and such opinions were prepared independently of any other interests, including those of Barclays Capital and/or its affiliates.

Neither Barclays Capital, nor any affiliate, nor any of their respective officers, directors, partners, or employees accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from any use of this publication or its contents. The securities discussed in this publication may not be suitable for all investors. Barclays Capital recommends that investors independently evaluate each issuer, security or instrument discussed in this publication and consult any independent advisors they believe necessary. The value of and income from any investment may fluctuate from day to day as a result of changes in relevant economic markets (including changes in market liquidity). The information in this publication is not intended to predict actual results, which may differ substantially from those reflected. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results.

This communication is being made available in the UK and Europe to persons who are investment professionals as that term is defined in Article 19 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion Order) 2005. It is directed at, and therefore should only be relied upon by, persons who have professional experience in matters relating to investments. The investments to which it relates are available only to such persons and will be entered into only with such persons. Barclays Capital is authorized and regulated by the Financial Services Authority ('FSA') and member of the London Stock Exchange.

Barclays Capital Inc., US registered broker/dealer and member of FINRA (www.finra.org), is distributing this material in the United States and, in connection therewith accepts responsibility for its contents. Any U.S. person wishing to effect a transaction in any security discussed herein should do so only by contacting a representative of Barclays Capital Inc. in the U.S. at 745 Seventh Avenue, New York, New York 10019.

Subject to the conditions of this publication as set out above, ABSA CAPITAL, the Investment Banking Division of ABSA Bank Limited, an authorised financial services provider (Registration No.: 1986/004794/06), is distributing this material in South Africa. Any South African person or entity wishing to effect a transaction in any security discussed herein should do so only by contacting a representative of ABSA Capital in South Africa, 15 ALICE LANE, SANDTON, JOHANNESBURG, GAUTENG, 2196. ABSA CAPITAL IS AN AFFILIATE OF BARCLAYS CAPITAL.

Non-U.S. persons should contact and execute transactions through a Barclays Bank PLC branch or affiliate in their home jurisdiction unless local regulations permit otherwise.

In Japan, foreign exchange research reports are prepared and distributed by Barclays Bank PLC Tokyo Branch. Other research reports are distributed to institutional investors in Japan by Barclays Capital Japan Limited. Barclays Capital Japan Limited is a joint-stock company incorporated in Japan with registered office of 2-2-2, Otemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0004, Japan. It is a subsidiary of Barclays Bank PLC and a registered financial instruments firm regulated by the Financial Services Agency of Japan. Registered Number: Kanto Zaimukyokucho (kinsho) No. 143.

Barclays Bank PLC Frankfurt Branch is distributing this material in Germany under the supervision of Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin). This material is distributed in Malaysia by Barclays Capital Markets Malaysia Sdn Bhd.

IRS Circular 230 Prepared Materials Disclaimer: Barclays Capital and its affiliates do not provide tax advice and nothing contained herein should be construed to be tax advice. Please be advised that any discussion of U.S. tax matters contained herein (including any attachments) (i) is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by you for the purpose of avoiding U.S. tax-related penalties; and (ii) was written to support the promotion or marketing of the transactions or other matters addressed herein. Accordingly, you should seek advice based on your particular circumstances from an independent tax advisor.

© Copyright Barclays Bank PLC (2010). All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any manner without the prior written permission of Barclays Capital or any of its affiliates. Barclays Bank PLC is registered in England No. 1026167. Registered office 1 Churchill Place, London, E14 5HP. Additional information regarding this publication will be furnished upon request.